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Political Reform and Realignment in Italy (II) 
Democratizing Italian Democracy? The 1996 Elections 
and the Problems of the Center-Left Government 
Hideko Magara ( * ) ( * *)
“The most radical thing today is that the centrist has 
chosen a coalition with the left." 
Waltel・Veltroni
Vice Minister of the Prodi Government(l) 
INTRODUCTION 
April 21， 1996. Almost midnight. Massimo D'Alema， leader 
of the Democratic Party of the Left， PDS (Part仰 Democratico
della Sinistra)， appeared on the TV screen with a rather nervous 
countenance. He lost his composure when several of the mikes 
pushεd at him by the press hit him in the face. But he soon 
braced himself and made an extremely cautious declaration of 
electoral victory: “According to the information we have 
IJl:j 
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(*) I woulcl likeωthank profs. Rob巴rtoD'Alimonte， Gianclonato 八
Caggiano ancl Michele Salvati for their kind cooperation cluring my 六
re対 archst:ay in Italy for th{ユApril1996 election日ー
( * )Associatc f'rofessor， Depart附 ntof Political Sciencc， Institute of 
Social Science日， The University of T日ukuba，Ibaraki， Japan. 
(1) La Reμtblica. 30 giu符no1996，“Veltruni: non puo votarsi inclietro. la 
sinistra clel 2000." di Mino Flcilo. 
(2) RAI3. special TV program on the general elむction，April 21， 1996 
gathered so far， the Ulivo (Olive Tree) seems to be leadi時・..(2) 
The national broadcasting station RAI 3， then， focused on the 
ocean of flags waved by the citizens who thronged to the Piazza 
Santi Apostoli， Rome， in a ferment over the Ulivo's triumph. 
Romano Prodi and Walter Veltroni， no. 1 and no. 2 of the Ulivo 
alliance soon showed up to share in the celebration of victory 
with the full crowd at the piazza. They were not enthusiastic， 
however. They were rather cool. Other Italian citizens， too， 
calmly accepted the fact that the leftist-led coalition government 
for the first time since the W.W.II would be born. (3) 
At the 1996 elections， the Italian center-left achieved a 
beUer outcome than expected. The elections resulted in a narrow 
margin victory of the center-left. The victory， as a matter of 
fact， was an "historical success (4).. for the Italian left. Can a 
victory， then， be a firm step toward further democratization of 
Italian democracy? (5) 
The March 1994 elections， the first elections under the new 
electoral law， were won by the rightist alliance， ilPolo dellα 
Liberta. In the April 1996 elections， the second elections after the 
electoral law amendment， the center-left alliance， l'Ulivo， ros己to
power. Italian transition to a new regime， thus， cleared one 
crucial test for a more advanced democracy in that it realized a 
government alternation. During the transition from the First 
Republic to the Second Republic， not merely the issues of 
electoral reform and political realignment， but also a more 
essential issue concerning how to manage Italian capitalism 
hereafter came to be discussed by various social actors such as ?。?
? ?(3) for the same impression， se巴AlfonsoBerardinelli. 1996. Il grado zero 
della sinistra. Micro Mega， 2/96， p.42. 
(4) A叫lOr'spersonal interview with Prof. Roberto D' AlimOl山 athis 
ofice of the University of Florence， April 22， 1996. 
(5) for th巳oreticalconsideration on democratization under Polyarchy， see 
Hideko Magara. 1992. Seio DemokurasI仰 Chos仰 :Seiji to Keizai no 
Aida de (The Democratic Challenges in Western Europe: B巴tween
Politics and Economy). Tokyo: Waseda University Press. 
politicians， managers and capitalists， labor unionists and 
intellectuals. The presεnt Italian transition questions the very 
nature of the politico-economic regime of Italy. 
If the First Repu blic was maintained by a consociational 
pact between the DC (Democr，αZtαCristianα) and the PCI (Partito 
Com仰 istαItaliano)，then on what kind of pact would the Second 
Republic be based and by which actors would it be built? This 
paper observes how and with whom the center-Ieft government 
tries to determine the rules of the new game which might bring 
about a drastic restructurization of the Constitution and 
economic order during the process of ltalian politico-economic 
(6) 
regime change. 
1 THE LEFT， THE RIGHT， AND THE CENTER IN POST-
FORDIST ITALY 
Throughout the process of political institutional reforms， 
two mutually contraclictory clemands have appeared目 Oneis the 
pursuit of stability to put an end to the disorder of Italian 
politics， and the other is the demand for a change to eliminate al 
(7) the corrupted tracc、sof the First Republic. ¥11 A balance between 
change and stability would determine the contents of the ltalian 
transition. In any case， it is broadly recognized that the 
disturbance in ltalian politics since 1992 has been a crisis. (8) 
Yet， such a crisis did not break out suclclenly in 1992. Rather， a 
deeper root of the crisis can be found in the fact that a post-war 
consociational pact (9) between the DC-led coalition government 
四
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(6) Here I wil cxplore the広randpact that would deter・minethe very 六
framework of the new regime. About medium.sized pacts (electoral 六
coalition strategies)， 1 have already discussed elsewhere. S巴eHideko 二
Magara. 1996.“Political Reform and Realignment in Italy (I): The 
Dynamics of the Italian Electoral Reform and Its Transitional 
Outcome，" Tsukuba Review 01 Law and Political Science， 110. 21， 2/96. 
(7) Paolo Legrenzi. 1995. “Vogliamo il cambiamento. Anzi no， la 
stabilita，" Il Mulino， 6/95， allno XLIV numero 326. 
and the opposition PCI gradually suffocated civil society. (10) It 
became widely recognized that the problems of the old regime 
which were revealed through the disclosure of the Tangentopoli 
scandals can be attributed not only to Craxian-Andreottian 
corruption but also to the opposition， the Italian left， which did 
not radically oppose the corrupted regimes of Craxi and 
: (11) Andreotti. 
While “the end of ideology" was broadly hailed and leftist 
forces gradually retreated in most advanced societies， the Italian 
intellectuals tried to redefine new confrontational axes and 
sought a new leftist identity， which influenced the actual 
(12) volution of politics. ¥''''1 However， the ltalian left was embarking 
on the Social Democratic boat exactly when it began sinking. (13) 
Since ltalian industrialization came late and the eventual changes 
in values and capacity did not occur in a large part of Italian 
society， modernization was distorted and incomplete. The 
Mezzogio慨。 (South) did not achieve autonomous economic 
growth. The public sector was so inefficient that it could not 
(8) Michele Salvati. 1995. The Crisis of Government in Italy. New Left 
Review. no. 213. Sep./Oct. pp. 76-95.; Paul Ginsborg. 1996. 
“Explaining Ita!y's Crisis，" in Stephen Grundle and Simon Park巴r
eds.， The New ltalian Reかめlic:From the Fall of Berlin Wall to 
Berlusconi. London: Routledge. pp. 19-39. 
(9) The ltalian meaning of consociativismo is different from the English 
meaning of consociationalism. 
(10) A!essandro Pizzorno. 1993.“Categoria per una crisi，" Micro Mega， 
3/93， pp. 81-96. 
四 (11)Pao!o Flores D'Arcais. 1996. I populismo italiano: Da Craxi a 
~ Berlusconi， Roma: Donzelli editore. p. 13. 
五 (12)Norberto Bobbio. 1994. Destra e sinislra: ragioni e sign併catidi una ???
distinzione tolitica. Roma: Donzelli editore; Giancarlo Bosetti. 1993. 
Sinistra punto zero. Roma: Donzelli editore; Paolo Flores D'Arcais. 
1994. I disincanto tradito. Torino: Bollati Boringhieri editore. Bruno 
Tr巴ntin.1995. Lavoro e liberta. Hideko Magara. 1995. The ltalian 
IntelIectuals and Politics. Tsukuba Review of Low and Political Science， 
no. 18， 1995. 
(13) Michele Salvati. 1995.寸heCrisis of Government in Italy." pp. 91-3. 
even provide the services necessary to citizens. Unlike the 
counterparts in other European countries， the Italian left 
proclaims that a fair society is compatible with competition in 
free markets， while it clings to traditional mechanisms of 
solidarity and egalitarianism in the absence of social democratic 
practice. What actually matters under the new electoral systems， 
however， concerns how the left shows its self-identity as an 
alternative to the right. (14) The PDS in particular needs to show 
what kind of relationship it would build with the old guards 
(PPI and PSI). on the one hand， and with the new forces (i 
Verdi) on the other， especially how it would strategically place 
the centrists in its future scenario. The centrists are greatly 
affected by electoral systems. Under binary competitions often 
observed in majoritarian systems， the centrists， by definition， 
must be something in between， i.e. the third force. The centrist 
votes roam between left and right， but these were originally 
centrist electorates' votes. In such a case， politics becomes more 
centrist and the government and its policies tend to be 
(15) centnst. 
Secondly， how the left defines the centrists and how it 
strategically places them in the whole political spectrum is 
closely related to a fundamental theme of contemporary politics， 
i. e. what should be sought as citizens' identity and how to grasp 
contemporary Italy under post司Fordisttransformation. With 
respect to this point， Italy's problems are threefold. The first 
relates to small-sized firms and regionalism. Small-sized 
companies free from the impact of Fordist demise in Middle Italy 
or in the North-East are able to develop new economic， cultural ~ 
and politicaI possibilities. In Italy. as a whole， however，買
differences among regions stil persist and these differences may 
(14) Hideko Magara. 1995 “Itaria saha seito no hen'yo: posuto・
shakaiminshushugi no siten kara，" paper delivered to the Japan 
Association of Political Science， October 1995. 
(15) Giovanni Sartori. 1995.“La democrazia dela ide sbagliate，" Il 
Muli1w， 6/95， anno XLIV numero 362. p. 964-5. 
ノ、
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well leave serious problems of inequality. The second issue is 
connected to new strategies on the part of large enterprises. In 
Italy， post-Fordist transformation in the large corporate sector 
has just begun. Propensity and mobility required for market 
revitalization， which often contradict with human resource 
investment and motivation for participatory activities， may bring 
about a new social dualism: differentiation between full-time and 
part-time workers， between more privileged workers and others. 
A third problem bears on the production of non-material goods. 
Along with the growth of new markets of information， 
communication， public advertisement， software， leisure hours， 
(16) health， finance， a new class called nuovαborghesia has grown. 
It is true that social differentiation among enterprises and 
personalization of work do not always lead to social 
fragmentation. As Bagnasco argues， itis very possible that some 
forms of collective interest representation persist as social 
bases. Yet， itis also true that difference among social classes 
elevated during the 1980s and that the unemployed females and 
youths in the Mezzogiorno formed a new class of poor. (17) 
In response to such an economic transformation， post-
Fordist change also occurred in politics. Two traditional mass 
parties which had inherited historical legacies collapsed， and 
new political forces raised their heads. The Leg.αNord (Northern 
League) emerged， reflecting a particular structure of local small-
enterprises. By contrasting the interests and values of their 
regions with those of Italy as a whole， the Lega gained great 
success. The proportion of workers among Lega's voters is 
号clearlyhigher than that in other parties. The workers who 
support the Leg.αhave totally different characteristics compared 
主 withthe workers in Turin. Silvio Berlusconi's entry into the 
ノ、
(16) Arnaldo Bagnasco. 1996. L'ltalia in t仰 tidi cambiamento tolitico. 
Bologna: Il Mulino 
(17) Massimo Paci. a curadi， 1993. Le dimensioni della disuguaglianza: 
Rapμrto della Fondazione Cespe sulla disuguagl仰1zasociale in Itιlia 
Bologna: Il Malino 
political market was deeply related to the growth of the tertiary 
sector and production of non-material goods. Individualism， 
economic liberalism， market supremism， anti-welfare state -al 
of these are the values of a new bourgeoisie， exactly from whose 
base ForzαItalia emerged. (18) 
Owing to the advent of these new forces， Italian politics 
turned further to the right. Marco Revelli argues that the 
political competition which is usually conducted between the left 
and the right is in Italy carried on by the two rights: the one is 
populist right and the other is technocratic elitist right. The 
right defined as populist has tried to reap al the by-products 
generated by the institutional bankruptcy of Italian politics by 
electorally mobilizing those people against the traditional 
equilibrium. The populist right thinks that the historical block 
on which the First Republic was based (a competitive alliance 
between the large firms protected by the state and the organized 
workers) should be replaced by a new hegemonic alliance 
composed of owners of small companies， the unemployed， those 
excluded from industrial contracts， the middle class struggling 
with austerity policies and distorted income distribution. The 
technocratic right， represented by northern conglomerate Fiat 
and Mediobanca can be called the owner of the historical block 
or the saloon of ltalian capitalism. This sector of the right 
believes in the possibility of a gradual transition and in 
consensus building with organized labor. It also proposes an 
immediate re-equiliblization of public accounts and social 
policies， drastic cuts in public expenditure， and more flexible use 
of labor force. (19) 
Massimo D' Alema， leader of the PDS， too， recognized that 
四
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(18) Alnaldo Bagnasco. 1996. L刀aliain t，仰が dicambiamento tol似co. 主
Bologna: I Mulino， p. 37-8. 
(19) Marco Revelli. 1996. Le due destre: Le derive polit化hedel postfordis側.
Torino: Bolati Boringhieri. p. 7-10. 
(20) Massimo D'Alema. 1996. ProgeUare ilfuturo. a cura di， Gianni Cuperlo 
e Claudio Velardi. Milano: Bompiani. p・12.
(20) the ltalian right was formidable. ¥WJ As a matter of fact， thεright 
represented by Silvio Berlusconi of ForzαnαJ叩， Gianfranco Fini 
of the Alleanzα Nazionale (AN)， Roccωo Bu此此州t抗凶tiほg剖lior
continues to offer a populist anchor leading to the paradox of 
ltalian politics. The center.left Prodi government is. not an 
exception to this paradox. Lamberto Dini， former Prime Minister 
and now Foreign Minister of the Prodi government， is close to 
the center.right. Dini， who can share common values with 
Buttiglione， shows a political position different from Prodi's 
moderately left.leaning centrist stance. The fact that two 
(21) confrontational forces coexist in one coalition \6~) constantly 
contains the possibility of further centrists' turn to the right 
and， thus， a further conservatization of Italian politics as a 
whole. This difficult situation for the center.left can become even 
more severe due to the existence of the hard.liner Partito 
Rifondαzione Comunista (PRC) located outside of the government. 
The moderate left is， therefore， faced with Przeworski's 
(22) dilemma ¥'-''-'J here again. 
lt is not impossible to ovεrcome such a structural 
vulnerability on the part of the moderate left， however， by 
advocating radical liberalism and by practicing it through actual 
policies. Radical liberalism， which is based on the concept of free 
markets and self.reliance， is the very opposite of the current 
Italian public sector excessively protected by the state and the 
type of Italian capitalism that has evol ved in the form of local 
family enterprises. No matter how liberal Berlusconi tries to 
disguise himself， he belongs to a different dimension than liberal 
ぎmarketsin that he acquired 1山 businesssuccess by personal 
二 dealings with the politician Bettino Craxi. The AN that 
六 proclaimsstrong statism is located at the opposite of liberalism. 
J¥ 
Advocates of Iiberalism can be found most in the area of center. 
(21) Paolo Flores d' Arcais司 1996. I 炉'imlis附 italia陶 daCraxi a 
Beγlusconi. Roma: ])onzelli巳ditore.p. 16.17. 
(22) Adam Prz巴worski.1985. CaPilalism and Socuu Democracy. Cambridg巴・
Cambriclg巴 UniversityPre日札
left. The ex-republicans， socialists， and ex-Christian Democratic 
liberals share this value_ Even the PDS， which was not liberal， 
(23) now recognizes the principle of liberalism_ ，"01 The problem for 
the center-left to solve， therefore， ishow to attract moderate 
electorates' votes with the stil influential PRC stil existing to 
its left and how to build radical liberalism in both ideological 
and practical terms_ The ability of the center-left government's 
most challenging test wIll be the difficult decisions it must make 
with respect to thεtrade-off between European monetary 
integration and the protection of social welfare_ The way these 
decisions are made will determine the nature and shape of the 
Second Republic_ 
Even at such a time， however， the actors in Italian politics 
must recognize that they may be caught in the trap that they 
themselves have set. The center-left has not been able to 
extricate itself from institutional conservatism， because Italian 
political culture remains to be proportional and consociationaL 
What makes matters worse is that institutional conservatism is 
gencrated， not by the structure of political system once defined 
as the confrontation between the Catholics and the PCI， but by 
political tactics_ It is a matter of tactics and technique which 
(24) cannot be free from selfish and opportunist characters_ 
Actually， during the elections， egoism and inefficiency may more 
easily yield short‘tenn success than liberalism and efficiency， 
because people want to live under the existing protection in 
spite of their outward appeal for free competition and 
efficiency_ (25) ? 。 。
?? ?
(23) Michele Salvati. 1995. ';The Crisis of Government in Italy." p. 91-:3 
(24) Gianfranco Pasquino. 1995. “1 conservatorismo istituzionale del 
ccntrosinistra，" I J¥;1uliuo， 6/95， anno XLIV numero 326. 
(25) Michele Salv日ti.1995“The Crisis of Government in Italy." p. 95-6. 
2 THE DYNAMICS OF COALlTION BUILDING 
The Birth of the Olive Tree Alliance 
Although Italian politics is stil in the midst of a transition 
process， ithas become clear that the Westminster model of a two 
party system is not feasible under the Italian majoritarian 
system. Giovanni Sartori has already argued that the new party 
system created through the electoral law amendment is 
structurally inappropriate， and as a result， has lost the ability to 
represent various social demands. According to Sartori， the 
existing majoritarian system with singlεtOllr voting not only 
makes the majority fragmented but also paralyzes it.“The new 
system is not yet liberated from the fetters of consociational 
proportionalism. The adoption of an incorrect majoritarian 
system blocks the formation of real majorities目"(26) 
Berlusconi's overwhelming victory at the 1994 elections 
brought Italian politics to a new phase of its history， inwhich a 
charismatic leader is no longer a M llssolini type c1emagogue or a 
De Gaulle type military man， but was highly effective in a 
successful self-made businessman. Such a new form of charisma 
dominated the mass media， TV and newspapers. (27) Berlusconi's 
political success was obvious. Nonetheless， the Berlusconi 
phenomenon was not firmly rooted in Italian society. The 
instability of the political system and flllidity of electorates' 
political preference implicitly suggested the possibility that the 
situation would again make a drastic turn in the near future 
When Berlusconi fel from the post of Prime Minister because of 
九 theLegα's departure from the rightist coalition government only 
九~ seven months after the birth of his regime， the left turnecl into 
F七。offensi ve. 
The ltalian party alignment createcl many c1ifficulties for the 
(26) Giovanni Sartori‘ 1995.“La democrazia d巴1Iaidωsbagliate." Il 
Muli1ω， 6/95. anno XL1V numero 326. p. 959.963. 
(27) Norberto Bobbio e Romano Prodi. 1995.“Dialo符osul 'Ulivo，" Micro 
Mega， 5/95. p. 20-2l. 
left to build a new coalition against Berlusconi. The Lega led by 
Umberto Bossi was no doubt intractable. Bossi， who had arrived 
on the Italian political scene as an anti -systemic force by 
proclaiming strong federalism， began to hold the anti守Berlusconi 
flag when other parties agreed to the idea of moderate fiscal 
federalism. The Legαgathered stable votes around 6%. The 
problem was that the Lega might turn to the right again if 
Berlusconi exited， in spite of Bossi's present sympathy with the 
left. The Verdi (greens) was the only leftist party that had 
success at the 1994 elections and maintained or even enlarged its 
influence. Compared with other parties， the Verdi was obviously 
at an advantage in that it had a clear identity， was universa11y 
recognized， and had strong ties to the ecologist parties a1 over 
the world. The only probJem with the Verdi was that it lacked 
strong leadership. The PRC was a difficult entity. While it was 
impossible for the PDS to ignore the PRC， which gained 7 to 8% 
votes， itwas also true that the former could not obtain broader 
support from workers because of the presence of the latter. If 
the PDS approached too close to the PRC， itwould lose moderate 
votes. When it went too far from thεPRC， the PDS would lose 
workers' votes. Yet， it was argued that the PRC could be 
neutralized by changing the electoral systems again to introduce 
a dO11biE tour systeIII-(28) 
The biggest problem lay within the PDS. The PDS needed to 
show clearly that it would either choose the social democratic 
line or the democratic line. On the one hand， Northcrn European 
Social Democracy did not seem to fit the Italian center， an 
imp似 antwOlll仙 epartner for the PDS. On the other hand， the 元
democrats' line aimed to unite various grollps with varying 八
interests into a loose， articlllated structure by forming a center- 七
left alliance. While the hard与liners'threat might be mitigated in 
such a big alliance， the political direction would become 
ambiguous. 1 any case， the PDS needed to attract and pcrsuade 
(28) Piero Ignazi. 1995. Il peso del Pds sul centro-sinistra. p. 461巴465.
Italian citizens who had said good-by to the past. As a matter of 
fact， the PDS stil kept its class-oriented character. What was 
required was rather a step toward the second reform of the 
party based on the slogan of “liberal revolution，(29) advocated 
by young PDS leaders. (30) 
The devastating defeat at the 1994 elections was largely 
caused by the fact that the leftist alliance lacked candidates who 
definitively attracted electorates. The PDS new leader Massimo 
D'Alema， who concentrated his energies on forming an anti-
Berlusconi alliance， chose economist Romano Prodi， a catholic 
leftist and ex-president of the IRI， as leader of the new center司
left alliance. Professor Prodi， who kept relations with various 
political forces miraculously well， seemed capable of uniting 
centrist and leftist forces. By maintaining certain distance from 
al groups， he kept himself independent and extra-partitic. Such 
a stance suggested his ability to bring over the PPI to a new 
(31) coalition. 
On April 24， 1995， Professor Prodi made a crucial decision 
at la Vecchia Roma， a restau rant in Bologna. Seven persons 
appeared. From the PDS， four people joined including Massimo 
D' Alema and Walter Veltroni. On the part of Prodi， the 
Professor himself and his two advisers participated. At the table 
of Vecchia Roma they agreed on the following three points: (1) 
the center-Ieft alliance should attract moderate votes without 
losing leftist votes; (2) the Ulivo should be organized not as a 
party but as a locus where every center-left force can gather; 
(3) the candidates should run for the elections with the Ulivo's 
ticket (not with the oak tree's) under the majoritarian system 
(32) but with each party's ticket under the proportional system. 
??????
(29) for the concept of liberal revolution on the part of the PDS， se 
Massimo D'Alema. 1995. Un Paese Normale.: la sinistra e ilfuturo 
del'Italia. Milano: Arnoldo Mondadori editorι¥入lalt巴rVeltroni. 
1995. Una Bella Politica. Milano: Rizoli. 
(30) Piero Ignazi. 1995. Il peso del Pds sul centro・sinistra.p. 465. 
(31) Ibid. p. 461-465. 
The confrontation between Prodi and Berlusconi hcre opened th巴
door for two coalition politics. 
The Italian el巴ctorates，however， were stil apt to oscillate. 
The left， which won at the local clections of April 1995， 
organized a refercndum to outlaw politician Berlusconi's control 
of TV. At the Junc actual rcferendum， however， the Italian 
citizens continued to support Berlusconi contrary to the leftists' 
expectations. The leftist alliance keenly realized the difference 
between local politics and national politics that were easily 
personalized through mass media. 
The PDS could not but establish a coalition with th巴
centrists in order to beat Berlusconi. At the party congress in 
July 1995， the PDS officially declared that it would recommend 
catholic leftist Romano Prodi as candidate for Prime Minister 
and Walter Veltroni for Vice Minister in the next general 
elections. The PDS decided not to make electoral programs on its 
own but to leave them subject to the discretion of Prodi's staff 
and then follow his programs. 1n so doing， the PDS aimed at 
absorbing moderate votes. The PDS chose a“timid (33)" strategy 
without carrying out another self-reform， i巴.without becoming 
literally a center-left party by changing its name again， and 
without nominating a center-left candidate for Prime Minister 
from its own party. 
For Massimo D' Alema， the ltalian right led by Berlusconi 
was a huge menace. Yεt， D'Alema want巳d to strike the 
vulnerable points of Berlusconi who excelled in obtaining the 
broad support of electorates， by stressing the lack of policy 
implernentation ability on the part of the rightist alliance. (3，1) 王
D'Alema， who seriously tried to repaint the image of the left，六
sought th巴leftistground not in the traditional terrns of class and 七
(32) Bruno V巴spa.1995. I Duello: Chi vincera nello scωuro finale. Milano: 
Arnoldo MOl1dadori Editorc. p. 207. 
(3)九!icheJeSalvati. 1995. '‘The Crisis of Government in ItaJy." p. 90 
(34) Massimo D'Alema. 1996. Progetla陀 ilβtluro.a cura di Gianni CuperJo 
e Claudio Vel且rdi.Milano: RCS Libri. & Grandi Opere. p. 12. 
solidarity but in identification to community and family. He also 
proclaimed the necessity to cooperate with voluntary and single匂
issue groups and located pluralist communities as the most 
efficient mediator that would link the state with society‘(35) 
He， at the same time， stressed that the welfare state must be 
reorganized:“The crisis of welfare generated a deep division in 
ltaly. On the one hand， there exists people protected by the 
welfare state - a strange combination among certain parts of 
labor movements， traditional or matured production sector， 
broad strata of bureaucrats and professionals， managers at the 
social policy agencies， big enterprises which greatly enjoy favors 
created by social buffer policies. The other block composed of 
more dynamic sectors (small-and medium-sized companies， new 
professions)， which contains the yo凶 1and fcmales， has not been 
protected by the traditional form of welfare redistribution， thus 
has become an anti-welfare social block. If this 【livisiondeepens 
further， and if we are with the old block， the left wilI lose， 
because the old block is practically and culturalIy based on the 
civil categories that we cannot tolerate， i.e. the male， adult， 
employed and unionized. This structure does not involve the 
youth and females， and it also exclucles the weak and 
newcomers. We need a welfare state which invests for the future 
and for the new generations， a welfare state whIch turns 
resources to innovation ancl provicles more opportunities and 
chances of li ves and fils the vacancy of securities and 
insurance. We must escape from an old social clemocratic 
compromise -in the ltalian case， a peculiar form of degenerated 
subsidizatiol1 by the DC -to establish a new welfare state 
a只ainst competitive individualism and cruel ultra-liberal 
(:3() "、culture. ¥''!' D'Alema's post-Fordist image is not so pessimistic 
(:37) as Revelli's. ¥，)Ij It is rather c10ser to ex-CGIL leader Bruno 
(35) Ibid. p， 24-25. 
(36) lbid， p. 33.35， 
(37) Marco Revclli， 1996. Le due destre. 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
(38) Trentin's post-Fordist view. 
In establishing the Ulivo alliance， Romano Prodi thought 
that grande cent仰 (integrationof al the centrist forces) was not 
a feasible idea.“With the existing electoral law， grande centro is 
impossible. Under a majoritarian system， as the British Liberal 
Party shows， the centrist obtains only a few seats. The Italian 
center-left alliance is composed of various forces and various 
themes， i.e. the seculars， Catholics， liberals， socialists， 
environmentalists and so forth. No consensus could be expected 
from the starting point. We must broadly and deeply discuss the 
essential parts of the government programs that can be shared 
by every participant of the coalition and prudently screen them." 
As Norberto Bobbio appropriately points out， however， this may 
(39) well be the vulnerability of thε Ulivo. 
Meanwhile， Lamberto Dini made up a new group， Lista Dini 
Rinnovamento Itαliano， on the eve of the 1996 elections aiming at 
enhancing his own position within the Ulivo alliance. Responding 
to this action by Dini， Prodi， too， strengthened his ties with the 
PPI and organized the Popolαre.Prodi block. Two centl匂tgroups 
were formed within the Ulivo， which increased the possibility of 
centrist revival and further transformation of ltalian politics. 
Reproduction of strong centrist tendencies， on the one hand， may 
favor the center-left alliance in that it would normalize the 
internal equilibrium of the Ulivo， which heavily leaned to the left 
composing two thirds of the Ulivo participants. Yet， on the other 
hand， the centrist resurgence created new problems. Firstly， it
seemed to bring an end to the magmatic situation of the Ulivo 
and divide the allied parties into two competing blocks: the 
leftist one around the PDS and the centrist one. The intention of 
the group that promoted the restoration of the centrist group 
was to create dualismo pαrtitico， a structure similar to that of the 
French center-ri財1tcoalition. While the French and Italian 
(38) Bruno Trentin. 1994. Lavoγv e Liberta. 
(39) Norberto Bobbio e Romano Prodi. 1995‘“Dialogo sull'Ulivo，" Micro 
Mega， 5i95. p. 17 
centrists are amalgamations of multiple Catholic and secular 
parties， the Italian PDS and the French Gaullist are rigidly 
organized， having strong identities and structures deeply rooted 
一・ (40) In regIOnS. 
Yet， people who try to implant the strllctllre of the French 
center-right coalition directly on the Italian center-left overlook 
a significant factor peculiar to French politics. The French party 
dualism fllnctions because the equilibrium bεtween the two 
forces within the center-right coalition are evenly， almost 
miraculously， balanced. The equilibrium of the two forces in the 
ltalian center-left cannot achiεve such an equilibrium， llnless the 
PDS makes a shift radical enollgh to let a large number of 
electorates move to the center (almost to the same position as 
the PCI's). Will the PDS make this choice to retreat? (41) 
Probably it will not. 
The April 1996 Elections 
In the April 1996 elections， the ltalian voters showed their 
discretion and maturity. They jlldged the responsibility verified 
by the three technocrat governments of Amato， Ciampi and Dini 
and gave a majority to the center-left， blocking the resurgence of 
the rightist maximalist Alleα12α Nαzω附 le(AN). The AN's votes 
were no morfthan 16%(proportIonal part)(42) 
The elections provided the PDS with the statlls of a primary 
party. D' Alema immediately expressed his intention to remove 
the sickle and hammer from the party symbol， which showed 
that the PDS had become a“normal" party. The leftist goal to 
j~ directly take part in the government was finally real泌氏1for the 
first time s釧inceRisorgi仰?ηmη1eω2η1t，ωO.This is an histor吋"lCa計1shift that 
主 req 山 ed a long and difficult tra 山 fonnatio叩n1 町 lu以凶d伽i
ノ、
(40) John W ドlaccus.1996. Che succecle日eil centro rinasce'? Riset. n. 27， 
p‘ 17 
(41) lbid. p. 18 
(42) E刊 enioScalfari. 1996. "Le speranze cl"ltalia，" L品 l?epubblica，23 
aprile 1996. 
Senato 315 seats 
centre left 
Rifondazione 
SVP 
Ulivo 
10 
2 
157 
169 
Table 1 
1 
27 
117 
others 
lega 
centre right 
polo 
Panella 
116 
1 
Fiamma 
SOllrce: La Repllbblica， 23 aprile， 1996. 
Camera 630 seats 
centre left 
Rifondazione 
others 
Ulivo 
「 ?
?
? 、
?
，?
??
???
。 ， ?
324 
Table 2 
59 
247 
lega 
centre right 
polo 
others 
246 
SOllrce: La Repllbblica， 23 aprile， 1996 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
(%) 
21.1 
6.8 
4.3 
2.5 
8.6 
10，1 
20.6 
15.7 
5.8 
1.9 
Table 3 Share of vote by pa同y
(Proportional Representation) 
PDS 
Pop-Prodi 
Lista Dini Rinov. [ta. 
Verdi 
Prc.Progr 
Lega 
Forza Italia 
Allenza Nationale 
Ccd 
Lista Panella 
Fiamma 0.9 
I‘7 others 
SOllrce: L'Unita， 23 aprile 1996 
changεs in identity and the establishment of a broad system of 
(43) social and political coalition building. 
The Ulivo alliance secured the absolute majority in the 
Senato (Upper House) without relying on the 10 seats of thc 
PRC (P.αrtito Rifondazione Comunist.α). In the Cα附 ra (Lower 
House)， however， the PRC obtained 35 seats (majoritarian 15 
seats plus proportional 20 seats) which can reach the absolute 
majority of 319 seats if added to the Ulivo's 284 seats. For the 
center-left， therefore， requesting the PRC for its cooperation was 
an unavoidable choice. Even though Bossi took part in thε 
center-rightist alliance Polo per le Libertu， they together would 
hold only 305 seats. In short， Prodi did not need PRC leader 
Fausto Bertinotti at the Seηαto but he did at the Camera. 
Bertinotti， who wanted to influence the government's policy 
making， criticizecl D'Alema's plan to remove the sickle ancl 
hammer from the PDS party symbol ancl proclaimed a revival of 
(i4) the scαla mobile. 
The Legα's outcome， 10% ancl 59 seats at the Cαmera， was 
much better than expected. Actually， the clefeat of the center 
right greatJy owecl to the recovery of the Lega which ran the 
elections inclepenclently. The Legαmight have obtained status as 
a key actor through which it coulcl promote fecleralism. 
Nonetheless， Bossi lost aロopportunityto take office， since his 
tactics to holcl the casting vote to control Italian politics were 
ineffective. (45) The situation in which the center-left could build 
a government without Bossi's help weakenecl his position. Bossi 
was irritatecl. He later frantically triecl to mobilize the Northern 
九 Italians proclaiming Northern Italy's separation and 
~ inclependence from Italy， confusing national politics in his 
七
1": (43) Ibid 
(44) La RejJubblica， 23 aprile 1996.“Prodi deve chiecl日rei nostri voti: 
Rifondazione detta le condizioni per sostenere l'lJlivo，" di UmberLo 
Rossi. 
(45) Eu克也nioScalfari. 1996. "Le speranze cI'Italia，" La Repubbilica， 23 
aprile 1996. 
desperation. 
When the Ulivo's victory was secured， Berlusconi expressed 
his sour-grapes attitude:“1 cannot wait to hear the overseas 
" (46) reaction to the leftist government." VH.'J Nonetheless， contrary to 
his expectations， the overseas comments on the electoral results 
were positive. Most of them were sympathetic to the victory of 
the center-left in that it would be better for social peace. ltalian 
capitalists， too， reacted similarly. For instance， Marco Tronchetti 
Provera， the new president of Pirelli， who expected the new 
government to promote further privatization and recovery of 
state finance， suggested that the markets reacted positively to 
the electoral results because the leftist programs were judged 
more European oriented compared with those of the right. At the 
same time， however， capitalists showed their precaution towards 
the PRC. “The scαla mobile is completely out of date. It 
contradicts with Europeanism. Even the Italian unions have 
matured to si只nthe luly 1993 pact. The PRC opposes the Ulivo 
with respect to the problems of privatization and Europe. The 
(47) center-left is heterogeneous concerning economic issues. 
According to the research on the 1996 elections conducted 
by Abacus， workers supported the Lega， while teachers voted 
for the ιTlivo_ Shopkeepers supported the Polo per le Liberta. Bossi 
had his strongest base among workers. Prodi's supporters had 
the highest proportion of university graduates compared with 
other parties' supporters. Berlusconi stil depended on 
(48) entrepreneurs and merchants. 
On April 22， the next clay of the elections， Walter Veltroni 
met some hunclrecl youths who had put their stuclies and work え
on hold for ful two months to help the Ulivo's electoral 0 
七
(46) La Rゆめblica，23 aprile 1996，“Ci vedremo t山 al'estero:L'amara ~ 
ironia di Bゼrlusconi，"di Vittorio T巴sta.
(47) Corriere della Sera， 2:i aprile 1996，“Attenta ale false partenze，" 
intervista con Marco Trollchetti Provera di Clalldio Lindner. 
(48) La Retubblica. 24 aprile 1996.“Operai con la Lega， lalreati COl 
]'Ulivo: Uno studio Abaclls." 
Support by allance Table 4 
L'Ulivo Fiamma Pannella Total 
+others 
Lega 
Nord 
Polo 
perle 
Liberta' 
SEX 
male 
female 
51 
49 
42 
58 
57 
43 
50 
50 
55 
45 
50 
50 
?
?
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?
?
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?
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?
? ?
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?
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AGE 
18-24 
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45-54 
55-64 
65 + 
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?
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??
? ? ?
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???
?? ?
??
??
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?
?
?
?
?
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?
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?
EDUCA Tl0NAL BACKGROUND 
umverslty 
high school 
junior high school 
elementary 
? ? ? ?
????
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? ?
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?
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ー
?
?????
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?
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?????
? ，
?
ヮ ?
??
， ?
?
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?
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?
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PROFESS10N 
entrepreneur， lib. prof 
commerc.， artlsan 
office worker 
teacher 
worker 
other occup 
housewife 
penSlOner 
student 
unemployed 
campaign voluntariIy when they came to drink in celebration of 
their victory. Velt仕ron剖1討ilooked like 
bonsaiおstωo them in honor 0ぱft出h児悶eirtriumph. Veltroni， who 
sympathized with Tony Blair and Bill Clinton and had stronger 
self.consciousness as no. 2 of the Ulivo than as a PDS executive， 
did not negatively evaluate the presence of the PRC in the new 
Italian political scene.“In the financial markets， people say the 
success of the PRC is dangerous for democracy. But 1 do not 
think so." Veltroni defined the PRC as an anti.fascist and anti-
authoritarian force and suggested that the center.left group 
source: La Repubblica， 24 aprile 1996. 
?????
?
would have a shared political stand with the PRC concerning 
competency-oriented basis， generational renovation and more 
(，19) 
appointments of women. 
()n the other hand， at the party congress in the coming 
autumn the PDS leader Massimo D'Alema， who made the first 
priorities of the new government constitutional reform， labor 
markct and probIems ()f the MezzogioYno， planned to discuss the 
formation of a grand leftist party that would attract external 
forces from outside thc Uli仰 ontht、basisof the political 
evolution of last sεvet・al years. Yet， in D'Alema's scenario， 
inclination not to the democratic party but to the social 
democratic party stil persisted.“1 do not oppose an idea of 
making a Democratic Party at all. It is no wonder if a 
Democratic Party is born tomorrow. But nowadays the European 
left is composcd of a largc group of socialist parties， social 
democratic parties， and labor parties. What we should pay 
attention to is the fact that it is social democratic parties with 
which we coopεrate in thc European Parliament. 1n the April 
elections， wc were actually very closc to social democratic 
， (50) parties." ，JV) D' Alema 01lt of consideration for the PRC asserted 
that the most seriolls problem for the new government to tackle 
was the labor problcm， while at the same time appealing to Bossi 
for “a constructive conversation with the Lega". Moreover， 
D'Alema sugヌestedto the Polo per le Liberta that he had the 
intention to give to one of the two speakers' posts either in the 
Senαto or in the Cαmera. All these behaviors flly d巴monstrated
(51) his subtly“political" aspect 
Meanwhile， there was a move to integrate centr凶 forces 又
arollnd Lamberto Dini. Dini， who had formed a political group 八
一一一一 一一一一一一一一一一一一一一一一 一一一一一一一一一一一一一一一 八
(49) La NeかIbbUca.23 aprile 1996ぜ“Un耳overnoin frelta e subito le 
riforme，" di Barb呂raPalomb巴Ili.
(50) L(/ Ne仰blica.23 aprile 1996. "D'Alcma g'ia progetta il partito del 
futuro." 
(5 J) Corriere dellaぷera，2:-3 aprile 1996 “D'Alema: al Polo una super 
presidenza，" di Francesco Verdenami 
called R抑制vamentoItaliano on the eve of the elections to stress 
his presence， was strategic enough to suggest just after the 
elections that even through he was Foreign Minister of the Prodi 
government， it might be possible to build grande centro by 
collecting al the moderate forces. He opened the door not only 
for ex-DC rightists who had turned to the CCD (Centro Cristiani 
Democr，αtici) led by Pierferdinando Casini and the CDU headed 
by Rocco Buttiglione， but also for Berlusconi's Forza Italiα. 
Although the center-Ieft's electoral victory was unshakable and 
Romano Prodi was going to be the next Prime Minister， the Ulivo 
needed the cooperation of the PRC in the Ca附 ra(Lower House). 
1n such a situation， Lamberto Dini， who had a strong ambition to 
be re骨installedas the Prime Minister， insinuated that he might 
approach the center-right with the pretext that he distrusted 
Bertinotti's PRC. For Dini， the CCD and the CDU were old 
friends with whom he shared values. (52) 
Responding to such a move， the CCD and the CDU severely 
criticized G~anfranco Fini， leader of the AN， arguing that the 
political defeat of the Polo per le Liberta was caused by a radical 
inclination too far to the right. Rocco Buttiglione， leader of the 
CDU， in particular， emphasized the possibility to form an 
alliance to capture a 26% share of votes among the CCD， the 
CDU and Forza Italia by excluding the AN whose share was 
15%. “We， after al， did not fully recognize the role and 
， (53) characteristics of the centrist in a center-right alliance. 
The situation in which the Ulivo did not obtain a majority 
by itself brewed a kind of tense atmosphere. As a matter of fact， 
the center-left did not at al underestimate the political problems 
in establishing a new government. 1t seemed that the PRC would 
not oppose the inauguration of the Prodi government at the 
beginning. Nonetheless， not only Prodi himself， but also D'Alema 
??????
(52) La Re仰blica.23 aprile 1996. "L'offerta di Dini: a Silvio chiedo…" di 
Stefano Marroni. 
(53) LιReか{blica.23 april巴1996.“Ccd-Cdu，gelo con Fini: l'obiettivo e il
Centro，" di Gianluca Luzi. 
and Dini fully recognized that it would be impossible for the 
new government to completely conciliate hard-liner Bertinotti 
Even if the Ulivo were in the hands of the PRC， the new 
government would start shortly. It seemed very plausible， 
however， that the government would pay extremely heavy costs 
in the fields of economic and social policies in return for the 
PRC's backing. The Ulivo particularly emphasized “stability" at 
its declaration of electoral victory， because it aimed to reduce 
the burden of the PRC by strengthening the basis of the 
government， especially the base of the moderates and centrists 
The Ulivo sent out various signals just after the elections 
D' Alema sought discussions with Bossi， Fini and Scognamiglio of 
Forza Italia， while Dini approached Casini and Buttiglione who 
might become leaders of the future grande centro. These signals， 
if carefully observecl， aimecl in one direction: stability， ancl in 
particular the equilibrium within the center-left coalition. That 
(54) is what exactly D'Alema aimecl at. 
The Grande Centro project and “Cosa 2" 
In such confusing circumstances， e、x-PrimeMinister Ciriaco 
De Mita advocated the revival of the DC as if the former DC's 
c1ishonor c1ue to the Tangentopoli scanclals was wipecl out by his 
winning at the April election. However， the PPI's reaction was 
simply negative. The PPI executives， in particular， incisively 
criticized De Mita's proposal: “comical!" “kiclcling us?" 
“nonsense!". On the other hancl， Sergio D' Antoni， leacler of the 
Catholic union CISL， who seemecl to have opinions close to De 
Mita's、claimeclthat it was import昌ntto establish a footholcl of ニf¥. 
20% to confront the oak tree (PDS) within the Ulivo without 六
losing their pricle as ex-DC members. Accorcling to D'Antoni，八
“the Ulivo is not a well balancecl coalition because it is too 
inclined to the left." (55) Geralclo Bianco， the leacler of the PPI 
(54) Coriere dela Sera， 23 aprile 1996 “Ulivo non vuole restare 
prigioniero di Bertinotti，" di Stefano Foli. 
argued:“Ciriaco (De Mita) limits himself. He must recognize 
that Italy is no longer the Italy that the DC controlled.…Thεre 
is nobody among us who wants to get the DC back‘We are now 
in the Ulivo and we know that history never moves in reverse. 
What is important for us is to support Prodi and fortify his 
government." Bianco thought that the stronger the PPI became， 
(56) the stronger the center-left coalition would be. 
Meanwhile， the friction within the center-right forces 
escalated further. The gaps between the ex-DC rightist CCD I 
CDU combination， the new conservative Forza ltalia， and the 
ultra right AN became merely unbridgeable. In this situation， the 
CCD leader Clemente Mastella and Pierferdinando Casini 
claimecl that the !勺10per le Liberta had alreacly cliecl ancl thaL 
they needed to form a new alliance among moderate forces. The 
ex-DC rightist CCD and CDU， which won an easy victory in 
Sicily at the June local elections， wantecl to clifferentiate 
themselves from Berlusconi ancl Fini. They thought a broader 
centrist alliance that would ab百orbeven the external moclerate 
Catholic forces was imperative. (5'1) 
With respect to Dむ Mita'sappeal for reconstruclion of thど
DC， Casini revealecl the stance that he clicl not have any intention 
to rebuilcl the DC， but wanted to start political“marketing" by 
allying with Buttiglione's group. Casini had already asserted for 
some time that the Polo per le Liberta muぉthave been more 
Christian Democratic at the time of political impasse for the 
ccnter .ri♂ht. He particularly日uggesteclhis日trategyfor local 
elections to be carried out in 1997 in Rome and Milan and other 
/¥， big cities to makc pacts“beyond the Polo". This is a strategy 
五 whichattempts to open the door even to the unsatisfied groups 
八 一一一一一一一一一一一一一一一一一一一一守一一一一一一一一一一一一 一一 月 一一一一一
四 (55) Corriere dellaゐra，23只ilgno1996.“Rifare la DC! Pel' De Mita un 
coro 11 no. 
(56) La Rej珂占bblica.2:-3 符1¥1只no1996 “Parla Bianco. 日vanisceil so只110clela 
Dじ，"di Stdano Marroni. 
(57) La Retubblica. 2:3只iugl10 1996“Ccl: Il Polo合l1lorto，"cli Riccarclo 
LUl1a 
???????
(58) 
within the Ulivo. 
At the end of June， there rose a voice claiming that the PDS 
should replace the sickle and hammer on its symbol with a rose， 
the symbol of European sociaJist forces， and， at the same time， 
that the party shouJd change its name of PDS， chosen by 
Occhetto， to become the Democratic Party of SociaJist Europe. 
This was the beginning of the D' Alema's project calJed Cosα2. 
By the Cosα2 D'AJema aimed to dissoJve the PDS， snatch back 
the sociaJist votes deveJoped by Craxi， and turn these forces 
along with socialists， Catholics， environmentalists into a new 
pluralistic amalgamation that would confront the would-be 
gr，αnde centro. GiuJiano Amato or Norberto Bobbio was supposed 
(59) to become a future leader in this scenario. 
Although D'Alema advocated a shift of leftist parties to a 
more solidaristic and more European-oriented democratic party 
of the left， a problem stil remained: why did the Jeftist forces 
need to form a totally new party instead of developing the 
center-left Uli1JO alliance further? The only reformist and 
Europeanist government led by the left was realized in Italy. On 
such a piecious piemise， D' AJema， who could not even imagine a 
mergcr bctwcen thc left ancl the centrist into one party， thought 
it necessary to both fortify the leftist force and reorganize the 
centrist force within the UI叩ocoalition. He calculatecl that the 
leftist votes within the Ulivo woulcl expand up to 30% by 
absorbing the group which hacl a leftist， reformist mentality ancl 
an anti白.fascist， proゐEuropean world-wicle view， i.e. Giuliano 
Amato's group. Bertinotti of the PRC commentecl: “D'Alema 
wants to make a social clcmoeratic party. But it will bc difficult. 
Social clcmocracy is already in crisis." In aclclition， thcrc was a 
storm of criticism insisting that D'Alcma's project was merely a 
rehash of Craxi 's scenario. D' Alcma wantecl to clifferentiate his 
(58) La l?epubblica. 26日11I耳no1996“Casini vuole arruolare gli scontenti 
cl巴ll'Ulivo，"'cli Gi日nlucaLuzi 
(59) La Retubblil'a. 24 giu符IlO 1996 “Pds. verso a Co日a2，" cli Umberto 
Rosso. 
J¥ 
project from Craxi's by stressing“the problem with ltalian 
reformism is that there has been no reformist practice‘We need 
to think of new reformism totally different from traditional 
reformist parties' vision." Criticism arose， however， from both 
(60) left and right. 
ln retrospect， Craxi was the lcading actor in ltalian politics 
during the 1970s and 80s. He strengthened his small PSI by 
establishing a lib-lab alliance and tried to hold the hegemony of 
(61) the Italian left by pushing the PCI off to the ghetto. ¥"'J Then-PCI 
leader Enrico Berlinguer reproached Craxi as a“menace for 
democracy". Nonetheless， Craxi chose to make a secret relay pact 
with Andreotti and Forlani (so-caIled CAF) on出epretext of 
“governability"， almmg at taking office alternately among them 
rcgardless of any elcctoral results， when he realized his “long 
waves" ran on a sunken leftist rock. PracticaIly speaking， his 
political life ended here. After then， thc PSI exccutives were 
(62) forced to oppose and criticize their own party. ¥<J"'} Those who 
feared D'Alema's approach to Amato felt that D'Alema， who was 
faced with the collapse of the PSI， considered it necessary to 
absorb the PSI out of recognition that an European left without a 
(63) socialist party could not be imagined.I"')) On thεother hand， 
Vice Minister Waltcr Veltroni， who stressed the necessity ior 
thc Ulivo to become a more dcmocratic coalition beyond social 
clemocracy， restrained D' Alema's scenario by pointing out the 
backwardness of social democracy.“1 think we neecl to pul verize 
the principle that only communists and social democrats are the 
(60) La Repubblica. 29 giugno 1996.“D・Alema:una rosa al posto di falce e 
martello，" di F巴dericoGeremicca. 
二 (61) For the details， s巴日 Hideko Magara， 1996 “Political Reform and 
八 Realignm巴ntin Italy ( 1 ): The Impact of 1989 and an Italian 
~ Respons巴"Tsulmba Journal (~f Law and PoWical Science， no. 20. 
(62) Hideko Magara. 1996 “Reform and Realignment in Italy ( I): The 
Dynamics of the Italian Electoral Reform and It日 Transitional
Outcome，" 7、sukubaJournal 0/ Law and Polilical Science， no. 21. 
(63) Giuliano Zincone. 1996.“Se la politica e 5010 rancore，" Coγriere della 
Sera， 2 luglio 1996. 
left.… Unfortunately， social clemocracy is clefeatecl in France， 
Spain and Germany圃… Canyou say that the French communists 
are more leftist than Tony Blair only because they are seated on 
the left sicle of the parliament?" (64) 
As a matter of fact， the PDS was required to harmonIze the 
legacy of the PCI with its own image of the European left 
throughout the electoral campaign. It was true that the PDS 
could not get the votes necessary for the victory without the 
cooperatIon of the centrist forces including the PPI. Yet， the real 
problem was not a matter of numbers. Rather， itwas related to 
the image ancl iclentity of the party. The Ulivo surely brought 
numerous votes to the PDS. But， at the same time， itimposed on 
the PDS a heavy cost in terms of iclentity. The PDS has not yet 
created its own post-communist identity to represent a large part 
of the Italian electorates. The Ulivo by itself coulcl not respond 
to the historical problem of Italian politics， i.e. the problem of 
Christian Democratic mutation and the leftist transformation. A 
(65) coalition cannot be a substitute for identity. 
How dicl the centrists within the Ulivo react to D'Alema's 
Cosα2 then? The PPI leader Geraldo Bianco， who kept a 
skeptical stance to Dini's inclination to the right， strongly urged 
Romano Prodi to normalize the balance of power within the 
coalition whose tendencies were obviously leaning to the left. 
Auturo Parisi， advisor to the Prime Minister Prodi responded to 
" (66) such a request by saying "we indeed agree with Bianco. 
On July 2， Amato told:“This time， itis worth listening as a 
citizen to the appeal that insists on the reconstruction of the 
Italian left through integrating reformist forces." D' Alema 八
immediately responcled to Amato:“It is 110 use arguil1g about the _:: 
j¥" 
(64) La Repubblica， 30 gillgno 1996，“Veltroni: non puo voltarsi indietro. 
la sinistra del 2000，" di Mino Fuccillo 
(65) Ezio Mauro. 1996. "Il思overnoe fato si faccia Ja sinistra，" La 
Repubblica， 27宗1U日1101996. 
(66) La Retubblica， :)luglio 1996，“Da Palazzo Chigi un si ala proposta di 
Bianco." 
F七
past. We must put an end to the past and restart from thε 
beginning." The distance between thεtwo shrank visibly 
(67) here. ""! For D' Alema， itseemed peculiar that three Italian 
parties -PDS， SI， PSD -joinecl the European Parliament 
separately. D'A1ema thought that they shou1d have merged 
immecliately after the collapse of the Berlin W a11. (6自j
Giuliano Amato affirmed D'Alema's project to make a new 
ltalian reformist party through a merger. D'A1ema emph乱sized
that his scenario did not aim at linking the past 1egacy of the 
PCI to the clebris of the old PSI. Rather， he stressecl， itaimed at 
estab1ishing a po1itical force that existed in Europe but did not 
exist in Italy， i.e. a rcformist party. Meanwhi1e， Amato objected 
to the idea of socialist breakdown. He instead defined socialism 
as essential for democracy.“Socialist parties have stabilized 
European societies by raising the question of civil rights without 
destroying production machinery. Its role has not ended at al1." 
D' Alema responded to Amato:“we are already on the same 
ground." Amato insisted further that it was necessary to build a 
fair and European-minded big re{ormist force. When asked by 
the press if the Ulivo was insufficient， Amato answered:“No， we 
， (69) have to fortify the Ulivo. 
However， the Cosα2 project advocated by D'Alema opened 
up a crack within the Italian left. Socialist Gino Giugni while on 
the one hand recognizing that the lingering peculiarities of the 
PSI brought problems to the Italian left， on the other hand 
suggested his positive view regarding the merger with the PDS， 
which was no longer eommunist. Claudio Petruecioli， a eonfidant 
γof ex-PDS leader Achille Occhetto、though宅 didnot hesitate to 
J¥. 
harshly blame D' Alema for justifying Craxi. Bertinotti of the 
入
八 (67)Corriere della Sera， 3 lUj日lio1996， '‘Vale la pena di tentare: Amato dice 
si a D'Alema." 
(68) Corriere della S'era. :i luglio 1996守 "Amato乱J)'Alema:Si， riuniamo la 
sinistra，" di Maurizio Caprara. 
(69) La Retubblu、仏 :iluglio 1996，“Amato abbraccia la Cosa 2，" cli Mino 
Fucilo. 
PRC， also， severely criticized such a Craxian project as a totally 
(70) authoritarian effort. 
Larnberto Dini censured D'Alerna's initiative to open the 
door for socialists， and for Giuliano Arnato in particular， in that 
D'Alerna misjudged the timing of his project. Craxi himself， too， 
criticized his forrner confidants Amato and Martelli in the 
AlleanzαNαzionale journal Secolo d'Jt，αlia proclaiming that 
socialists must recover by themselves. D' Alerna insisted that 
there was nothing to hide in his attempt to form a broadly 
ranged， democratic and European-minded Italian left.“My 
project will strengthen the government. It will never damage its 
governability." Despite his claim， itwas true that the Dini-
D'Alerna problem caused a new dynamic between the centrist 
(71) and the left in the Ulivo government. 
??
?
???
3 IN SEARCH OF A NEW POLlTICO・ECONOMICREGIME 
The DPEF and the Resurrection of Neo幽Corporatism
The Prodi government proposed at the end of June an 
economic program for the corning three years of 1997-99 called 
DPEF (Documento 出 ProgrammαzioneEconomica e Finanziaria). 
The government put first priority on Italy's return to the EMS 
(72) and the problern of unemployment. ¥lL.J As a matter of fact， the 
unemployment rate had already reached 12.3% and efficient 
measures by the government were eagerly awaited. Yet， what 
mattered most with the DPEF was that the targeted inflation 
rate would be maintained under 2.5% in order to keep up with 
European monetary integration planned in 1999. In the DPEF 
proposed by the Prodi government， the targeted inflation rate in 
1997 was set at the level of 2.5%， but it was supposed to be 
(70) Coriere dela Sera， 3 luglio 1996，“L'ombra di Craxi divide la 
sinistra." 
(71) Coriere de I品 Sera，5 luglio 1996，“Dini e D' Alema ai f巴ricorti per 
gli ex Psi." 
(72) La Repubblica， 28 giugno 1996，“La cura di Ciampi." 
lowered to2%in 1998.(73)The inflation rate targetεd at 2.5% 
immediately triggered a furious reaction from labor unions， 
(7~) particularly from the biggest CGIL led by Sergio Cofferati. ¥ 
Meanwhile， an ltalian commissioner to the EU Mario Monti did 
not hide his dissatisfaction with the DPEF from the opposite 
perspective. Monti criticized the measures presented by Prodi， 
Ciampi and D'Alema in that they lacked concreteness:“I wonder 
why such an authoritative government composed of intellectuals 
and establishment who have been enjoying a high international 
reputation does not propose more efficient measure's. The anti-
inflation measures are okay. But the markets particularly pay 
" (75) attention to cuts in the deficit." ¥' JJ The DPEF was， thus， 
criticized not only by the unions but also by the Europeanists. 
In such a context， itis noteworthy that neo-corporatism has 
been resurrected in Italy. Retrospecti vely， the series of 
technocrat governments of Amato， Ciampi and Dini were backed 
by extra-parliamentary social economic actors such as labor 
unions and C01ザindustr叩.At that time， al of the governments， 
unions and Confiηdustria exposed their vulnerability and were 
forced to depend on each other. The technocrat governments 
which had difficulty forming parliamεntary majorities and thus 
lacked democratic legitimacy needed external backing outside of 
the pure national elections. Capitalists and managers could not 
brush off the dirty image that worsened through the 
Tangentopoli scandals. Labor unions were continuously suffering 
from high unemployment rates. Neo-corporatism， which was 
politically and socially important during the 1970s， but ebbed in 
the 1980s， returned in the 1990s. (7時)
(73) Cor即 redella Sera. 28 giugno 1996，明日1'97 tagli e tasse per 32 mila 
miliardi." 
(74) L品 Retubblica，28 giugno 1996，沢estarein Europa costa 32400 
miliardi." cti Gennaro Schettino 
(75) Dorriere della Sera， 28 gi時間 1996，"Monti: non va ben巴， cosi l'ltalia 
rinuncia acl agganciare !'Europa." cli Anclrea Bonanni. 
(76) Michele Salvati. 1995“The Crisis of Government in Italy，" p. 83-4. 
?????
?
??????
The electoral victory of the center-left alliance did realize a 
pro-labor government. Some cautious critics had already 
suggested misgivings， however， if the privileged relationship 
between the unions and the center-left government brought about 
problems. Angelo Panebianco， for instance， argued that 
cooperative relationship between the government and unions， 
which was consolidated through the successive technocratic 
governments of Amato， Ciampi and Dini， might cause somewhat 
of a risk under the center-left Prodi government. According to 
Panebianco， unions may well resort to their veto power in every 
political situation and a union government (s例制toal gove附)
by the union political class may emerge. (77) 
The 13th Congress of the CGIL took place on July 2 in 
Rimini. Sergio Cofferati， the leader of the CGIL said that in such 
a crucial contextual change like the birth of the first pro-labor 
leftist government， unions needed to make a change and they 
also were ready to take a new role. Nonetheless， the relationship 
between the CGIL and the center-Ieft government was an 
extremely delicate matter. Should the CGIL choose a cooperative 
stance? Or， should it choose an aggressive position to carry 
through its own demands? According to Gino Giugni， the 
relationship between the CGIL and the government is rather 
complex compared with that in other European countries. 
Actually， the relationship between Prodi and the Catholic union 
CISL is comfortable， but that between the CGIL and the 
(78) government involv巴sa certain degree of disharmony. "01 Yet， the 
CGIL fully utilized such a situation to protect itself by keeping 
some distance from the government. Cofferati， too， guarded 
himself from the PRC and the opposition within the CGIL by 
a 
(77) Angelo Panebianco. 1996.“Sindacato al gov巴rno，"La Re，仰 bblica，21 
giugno 1996 
(78) La Retubblica， 2 luglio 1996，“La mia Cgil deve cambiare: Cofferati 
lancia la sua sfida，" di Giorgio Batistini. 
(79) Giulio Anselmi. 1996. "La bilancia di Rimini，" La Retubblica， 5 luglio 
1996. 
maintaining the autonomy of the CGIL from the government. (79) 
Cofferati was flooded with the long applause of some 1500 
union representatives at the Congress on July 2， when he 
announced that the CGIL was ready to go on strike if Prodi 
would not revise his plan to cut the public expenditure of 21 
trillion lira as suggestecl il1 the DPEF. He objectecl to the 
recluction of the welfare state.“We will fight with every means. 
Strikes are a possibility." Y ct， he added that the CGIL would not 
go on strike unless the CISL and the UIL agree. By saying so， he 
suggested that they would not make any concessions to the first 
leftist government and that there remained a litlc room for 
bargaining目 D'Alema immediately declared that the PDS was 
prepared to partially revise the DPEF as the unions requested， 
which surprised those arouncl him. Cofferati on the onc hand 
recognizecl the importance of the EU matters and the necessity of 
strict measures to meet the European requirements， but at the 
same time he claimed that these measures should be “fair even if 
， (80) ngorous 
Cofferati also made it c1ear that the CGIL was completely 
autol1omous from the center-left government ancl had no 
intention of entrusting somebocly elsc with its own social 
representation. He further proclaimecl that certain parts of the 
DPEF proposecl by the Prodi government wcre inappropriate 
and needecl to be revisecl. The theme of the Congress was 
“work"， for which CoHerati presentecl three requests on the part 
of the CGIL: (1) revision of the Maastricht Treaties conccrning 
employment and investment on infrastructure， (2) red山 tionof 
二 workinghours to 35 hours per week ancl transition to 32 hours 
εregime by the year of 2000， (3) maintaining employment， 
九 particularlyin the South. Capitalists' leader Agnelli of Fiat and 
self-made busine日sman-tu rnecl民politician Berlusconi expresscd 
their uneasiness if Italy coulcl not jump on the European train 
with the present government司spolicies， claiming that the EU 
(80) Corrie仰 della仇γa，3 luglio 1996.“Cofferati: se Procli non cam bia e 
SCloper・0."cli Enrico Marro 
Commissioner Mario Monti's stance was more appropriate. 
D'Alema， on the other hand， was concessive to the CGIL and 
(81) emphasized that the DPEF could be revised. 
On July 4， Thursday， Veltroni went to Rimini where the 
CGIL Congress took place and appealed to the union 
representatives:“There is no alternative to the Ulivo. It is okay 
to criticize Prodi. But if he collapses， the right will be back." 
Prior to V eltroni' s visit to the Congress， D' Alema intervened on 
Tuesday when Cofferati negated the government's DPEF. On 
Wednesday Prodi himself showed up to the Congress and tried 
to persuade unionists to cooperate with the government. 
Although he got applause， there remained some degree of 
confusion. And on Thursday， finally， Veltroni tried to attract the 
CGIL on the pretext of “shared objectives and reforms." (82) 
Nonetheless， Cofferati's harsh answer to Veltroni's appeal was 
straightforward:“Veltroni is no different from Berlusconi， ifhe 
，(83) does not respond to our request through action. 
Capitalists' Scenario for a New Regime 
It had never happened that a crucial decision on economic 
policies and political change rose simultaneously and that Italy 
needed to make such a fundamental choice. (84) The end of the 
First Republic， the leftist victory in the April 1996 elections， the 
center.left government's proposal for the DPEF and the 
consequent heated dispute， trends toward a new political 
realignment by the left and the right， and the coming 
Constitutional reform -al these may well change the essence of 
(81) La R仰 bblica，luglio 3 1附，“Al仙 diCofferati al gover 
Vittoria Sivo. 九
(82) Corriere della Sera， 5 luglio 1996.“Veltroni ala Cgil: atenti， 0 noi 0 ニ
la destra，" di Giuseppe Sarcina. 
(83) Corriere della Sera， 6 luglio 1996.“E concertazione la parola magica，" 
di Giuseppe Sarcina. 
(84) Giulio Anselmi， 1996. "La bilancia di Rimini，" La Repubblica， 5 luglio 
1996. 
the Italian political -economic regime. Such a move toward a 
regime change rose not only in the political arena but also in the 
economic arena. And it was in the field of economic reform that 
capitalists took the initiative. The capitalists' reform project was 
firmly grounded with the Constitutional reform issue within its 
scope. 
At the Milan Conference on “which capitalism will the 
Second Republic choose?" sponsored by the monthly journal 
“Liberal"， Cesare Romiti， President of Fiat， strongly appealed for 
constitutional reform which would secure deregulation of the 
markets， insisting that family capitalism had ended and that 
Italy needed to Iiberate itself from the non-sustainable burdens 
of the state and to build a new model of capitalism， a new model 
of world economy. Many VIPs of Italian economy attended the 
conference. Among them Giuliano Amato showed a relatively 
pessimistic view there:“The market is a place not for padrone 
but for everybody. But the Italians， unfortunately， continue to 
prefer compromise to reforms目" The Italian economy had to 
make a new rule to acquire international compctiti veness. Amato 
asserted that Italy should change the structure of the state on 
the basis of a market system completely different from the old， 
dead mechanism of Taylorism. 
Ineffective state finance， European integration， distorted 
welfare state， exccssive statism， inefficicncy -al of these things 
that characterized Italian capitalism under tartitocraziαare now 
targeted for reforms. Romiti， who proclaimed the demise of 
family capitalism， insisted that the control of the Italian economy 
by the stable core of capitalism， i.e. strong stockholders， should 
replace family capitalism. For Romiti， what matters most is 
liberalization and markets. He stressed that Italy needed a new 
constitution which would reduce statc intervention， cut public 
expenditure， secure the autonomy of the central b呂nk.The whole 
Italian economy has now become a target for an“emergent" 
argument. Marco Tronchetti Provera， new president of Pirelli， 
who feared that Italian politics returned to the old logic， 
… ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
???????
enthusiastically appealed for prompt reforms:“Now is the time 
for choice. Those who want to retard such a choice would be 
heavily responsible forItalian future." 
Among rnany econornic leaders， a female capitalist leader 
Emrna Marcegaglia， no. 2 of Coηβndustria Carlo Carieri， ex. 
leader of ConfindustriαLuigi Abete， and Ernesto Pascale of the 
STET al of whom cal1ed themselves liberal participated in this 
conference. All of thern proclaimed reorganization of the welfare 
state and economic liberalization. Ferdinando Adornato， chief回
editor of the monthly “Liberal" was supposed to build a group 
for constitutional reform after the conference. (85) 
What was clear to every participant in the conference was 
the following: first， former prirne minister Giuliano Amato 
wanted to return to politics (as prirne minister， of course); 
second， Cesare Romiti of Fiat wanted to show his political 
leadership in the promotion of Italian economic and 
constitutional reforms; third， capitalists hoped not for a gradual 
but a bold and irnmediate economic reform. Rorniti's reforrn 
proposal was clearly liberalist. Yet， according to journalist 
Eugenio Scalfari， a new rule must be solemnly approved in the 
form of a basic law based upon a new social pact by the citizens， 
even though introduction of more markets has gained a broad 
(86) consensus. 
Meanwhile， the EU planed to request Italy to make further 
measures in addition to the DPEF to reduce the deficit of the 
public accounts. The EU predicted that the Italian deficit would 
rise to 5.4% of her GDP in 1997. This figure is higher than the 
standard set in the Maastricht Treaties for the entry to the 
monetary integration by 2.5%， and exceeded the figure set in the 
(85) Corriere della Sera， 6 luglio 1996.“Un capitalismo da riformare，" di 
Danilo Taino. 
(86) La Repubblica， 6 luglio 1996，“Romiti: Piu mercato， questa e la 
riforma，" di Rinaldo Gianola. 
(87) Corriere della Sera， 5 luglio 1996.ゆovetefare di piu，" di Andrea 
Bonanni. 
DPEF by 1 %. (87) 
The ex.prime minister and present Treasury Minister Carlo 
Azeglio Ciampi thought， as Mario Monti did， that the government 
should take every measure to push Italy into Europe. Prodi， who 
opposed “sadist liberalism，" suggested that such harsh measures 
that might harm Italian economy would not be welcome. (88) 
Pro心G1LMassimo D'Alema applied pressure upon Prodi by 
insisting that the ceiling of 2.5% did not make much sense and 
that the government shoulcl compensate for the clifference 
between the targeted inflation rate and the actual inflation rate 
in order to secure new consensus. As a matter of fact. the actual 
inflation rate in June marked 3.9%. On the other hand， Bertinotti 
of the PRC threatened Prodi sugge円tingthat his party would 
vote against the measures if the government did not ehange its 
policies. The stock market shrank owing to the clouble attacks 
from the PDS and the PI~ C. In such a situatiol1， Geraldo Bianco 
of the PPI clicl 10t hesitate to accuse D'Alema. Bianco insisted 
that the parties in government should keep their nose clean and 
that they were required to support the government until the 
ltalian economy reached the European level. However， when 
Prodi put first priority on the Maastricht matters the PRC 
criticized that the government paid attention only to markets and 
did l10t care about society and people. The situation was almost 
like a proclamation of war.ゆ日)
The “Poteri Forti" Dispute 
1n an interview to Corriere della Ser，αdatecl July 7， Massimo 
七 D'Alemarevealecl an opinion tl1at would later provoke a big 
dispute. According to D' Alema， Italian capi江talism had the 
主 tendency tωo in川 t民ew 巳印ωa叫k倒e釘ningof the go仰V刊附eωI印 me印n此t.D'Alいemas幻臼叩a氾lはl
C t出h3汎tcapi比ta計li怜st胎swou川11d10 日以叩c、powe引げri υf t出:hcgovernment a抗cquir町'cd
(8) Corriere della Ser，ι:i luglio 1996.“lvlanovra aggiunta? Altra c1i 。'Alema，"di Dino Vaiano 
(89) Corrierγ della Sera. 6 luglio 1996.“Contratli. [)'Alema contro il telto 
c1i Prodi，" di Marco Cecchini. 
more power and that thi日 wasa structural fact.“1 do not say it 
is a conspiracy. But among ltalian capitalists who control cven 
newspapers you can fincl those who have interests in weakening 
governments. Therefore， Italian governments have beεn 
vulnerable." What D'Ale巴印marefたerr咽eぽ吋dtωo was so-calle巴d poter行'ilortμ i
(st幻rれ刈-ongpowe、rs叫)， i.e. huge Ita凶討i悶山ncon時glo印)川me
even journa心liぬsm. “Theyintend to put governmcnts in weak 
circumstances， i.e. uncler prcssure， because the more vulnerable 
governments become， the stronger the capitalists' powcr would 
be." In adclition， D'Alema revealed his dissatisfaction， insisting 
that ncwspapers were ful of exaggeration since the installment 
of the Procli government and that the Ulivo did not promote 
reforms seriously. (90) D'Alema's comment showecl his own 
irritation with the possibility that leacling ltalian papers' 
everyday reports on the intra government friction and on 
conflicts within the left might incl1r an extremely serious 
situation 
Was D・Alemaso exhaustecl in coping with the internal 
dissonance of the government and the bargaining with the union日
that he carelessly showed his real colors? Or， was that a part of 
a scrupulously calcu!atecl long-term strategy? In any case， 
D'Alema's ar只umentpoured oil into the fore of a dispute that 
had been sputtering among capitalists and politicians. On the 
same day Prodi immecliately tried to wipe out D' Alema's worcls 
at the TV night news saying “my government is not at al in 
crisis，" but it coulcl harclly help ease the situation. D'Alema's 
words were particularly welcome to Berlusconi as a perfect 
target to aUaじk “D'Alemahides a real Bolshevik under his 'i: 
mask. lJltimately， a man like him never changes." (91 )弓
Giovanni Agnelli of Fiat fl 抗州州州1)匂y陀ぱ凶ft附 d D'Alem叫1
“Thc tale of poteri forti today is simply out of date. Probably it is 
(90) Corru刊 della Sera. 7 lu日lio1996 “もアogliono日pezzarele 耳目mbeal 
日overno."di Gian Antonio Stella 
(91) Corriere della Sera. 8 luglio 1996 “Prodi: il日110governo non corre 
rischi." 
a remnant of Marxist culture. We are no longer in 1948. We are 
neither in a period of Costa [Ieader of Corポndωtriafrom the 
immediate post war to 1955J， nor in a time of Vaωl'噌ena凱l凶 Fian
[heads of Edison and 孔Mo此 C町ca抗山tini r噂espectively duri 時 the 
1960sJ・… We肘 eda strong and fully legitimate government that 
possesses the power necessary for promoting reform and 
regaining efficiency in our systems and for bringing Italy into 
the European monetary integration. With a weak government， we 
cannot satisfy the conditions of Maastricht and will miss Europe， 
， (92) growth and development.' 
Meanwhile， Marco Tronchetti Provera， president of Pirelli， 
felt that the Ulivo government must have been in such a difficult 
situation that the leader of majority supporting the government 
mentioned so-cal1cd poteri兵Irti.According to Tronchetti Provera， 
“D'Alema's attack is just likc an alibi to negate objective facts 
The pressure on the government executivcs comεs rather from 
the insicle of the government majority and the time limit for 
entering Europe was probably in the back of their mincls. There 
is nothing to c10 with poteri戸rti.The entrepreneurs' interests are 
rather contrary to weak巳ningthe government. We want stability. 
Otherwise， the l10netary integration， lowering the interest rate， 
in vestment， economic growth ancl new employl1ent woulcl be 
， (93) 
impossible.' 
Piero MarzoUo， the vice presiclent of Confinduslriα， who 
openly revealecl that he himself votecl for the Ulivo alliance， saicl 
that the argument of pote1'iルrtiwas inappropriate. He expressecl 
his c1issatisfaction to the governl1ent:“1 cannot agree with 
七 D'Alema's opinion. We neecl to create the conclitions for 
~ international competition. 1 c10 not regret voting for the Ulivo， 
九
jへ but 1 expectecl l1uch morε. During the electoral campaign Procli " (94) promised to bring Italy to Maastricht within the time limit. 
(92) Coriere dela S付仏 8luglio ] 99Ei “Agnelli: potcri forti'? Non siamo 
neJ"48." 
(93) Coriere dela Sera. 8 luglio 1996. “Tronchctti: Uno日fo問， ¥"¥lole 
日C¥lot日rerUlivo." 
He further claimed that the view that the poteri forti opposed 
Prodi was contrary to reality:“Not only big but also medium and 
small-sized companies strongly hope for a firm and efficient 
system of infrastructure. We seek a strong government， a 
" (95) government that really governs." ¥""J Noteworthy is the point that 
al the capitalists and managers unanimously appealed that 
stability and the governments' initiative were necessary for them 
to keep up with Europe. 
On the other hand， Giuseppe Tatarella of the rightist AN 
analyzed that D' Alema set up a new enemy aiming at reinforcin只
the present vulnerable majority.“D'AIe、maformed a majority 
through a compromise among broad forces ranging from so. 
called poteri forti to Bertinotti in order to avoid the center-right 
coalition 父overnment.Yet. the center.left 五;-overnmentwealくむned
because it could hardly make a choice between the economic 
right and the ultra-left. Thus D'Alema wanted to make up an 
， (96 encmy to blame on.'" 
While the poteri forti argument became heatecl， the Procli 
government was facecl with an ordeal. The DPEF was supposed 
to be c1iscussed at the Cαmera Ol J uly 8. BertinoUi hacl alreacly 
c1eclared that his group wOllld votc against the government. He， 
on the other hand， was excited with D'Alema's poteri forti 
argum巴nt saying that the real enemy for the ltalians was 
Confindustria. When friction within t弘、又overnmentwas growin宗
more serious. the gr，αnde centro project advocated by Lamberto 
Dini entered a new phase: Bllttiglione propo日edan arrangement 
(97) for a centrist government for reform ‘This time， 1 will 
proposε[rom my side to Dini an idea to make the grande centro 七。
(94) Corriere dela Sera， 8 llglio ] 996“Marzotto: parlino meno， facciano di }L 
piu，" di (;ian Antonio Stela. l~ 
(95) La Reln!bblica. 8 luglio 1996亀“Maccht，poteri forti. Pensino a 
govern日rc，"di Antonio Calabro. 
(96) La Rりη!hblica，8 I uglio 1996. "(ミlisむr¥"cun nemic() per riunir日
ITJlivo." 
(97) La Relntbblica， 8 luglio 1996. '‘Govern仏1)1・0¥";¥clel flOCO." 
by integrating al the Christian forces within the Polo and to beat 
the Prodi government which can neither promote reforms nor 
enter into Europe." Casini， too， said:“The Ulivo will be going to 
be stalemate in autumn. We have already thought of post-Prodi." 
The Ulivo's Catholic leader Bianco， however， was stil skeptical 
(98) of such an attempt.ノ
Massimo D'Alema， who feared that the coalition government 
would crack because of a series of disputes and his own toteri 
戸rticlispute in particular， went to the Palazzo Chigi， the official 
residence of the Prime Minister. He explained to Prodi that it 
was important， even to thc、PDS，to stabilize the government. 
D' Alema attested that he had never considered any conspiracy 
on the part of the toteri forti and that he had no intention to 
oppose Prodi concerning the DPEF. Prodi， who had alrcady 
claimed on the previous night that his government went very 
well and had no particuJar probJems， reminded D'Alema of the 
importance of being prudent: “The DPEF is integra1ly 
structured. It is possible to arglle about some specific aspects 
but a1l the government members are supposed to share the 
responsibility for the DPEF." Forei交nMinister Lamberto Dini， 
too， emphasized that the Procli government was not in a critical 
situation:“the majority always has c1iscussions insicle. It is quite 
normal to argue about the futllre scenario." Giogio Fossa， th比巴
n肘ewleacler of Cοω?伐吋4げ併/β=れ初?ηtd仇uωstri似
capitalists were not going against the government arη1d that they 
wantecl a“、suf百fi化Clたer口ltlystrong" government in orcler to participate 
(99) ~ in Europe ancl resolve the economic problems. 
え Amongst this turmoil， Vice Mir山 ter Walter Veltroni 
Fお;howeヲ?光CI his own stance by maki加n只 ac1ear d出is叫ti泊nc叫ti叩on from 1  
g 凶 le佃ma's以: ‘、川1羽へ恥 a1lm凶拙emeasures to maintain office for 
11εxt five years. Ol1r government is not a washy but a reformist 
(98) La Rcpubblica. 8 lu必lio1996 “Ma prima abbattiamo Prodi，" di 
Gianluca Luzi. 
(99) La Repubblic(j， 9 luglio 1996. "1)' Alema tranquillizza Prodi，" cli Silvio 
Buzzanca‘ 
government. What we need is two things， time and the political 
stability. Other problems have nothing to do with the 
，(l (0) government even though they happen in a political setting. 
The CGIL leader Sergio Cofferati talked in the Corriere della 
Sera interview about his view on the poteri forti argument:“It is 
politics that must resume a strong role. The primary function of 
politics， to represent society， was lost during the period of 
political crisis between 1992 to 95. The only solution to avoid 
today's risk is to stabilize institutions." Cofferati further showed 
his stance with regard to the relationship between unions and 
the leftist-Ied government. By claiming that the left should be 
radical in the labor sector， Cofferati， on the one hand， suggested 
his distance from Democratic-Party-type unions. But， on the 
other hand， he did not accept the German-type Social Democratic 
uillons:“First of al， itis important to stress the distinction 
between political representation and social representation. The 
Ellropean Social Democratic model does not do so -unions 
compose a complementary part of the political alignment. I 
rather think Italy must maintain her uniqueness_ It was the 
unions' power that crushecl Berlusconi's pensiol1 reform project. 
There was cooperation between non-leftist workers ancl 
，(101) penslOners. 
On July 9， the government failecl to gain a majority in four 
committees among the nine which were gatherecl in order to 
cliscuss the DPEF. The PRC virtuallv votecl for an alliance with 
the center-right with regarcl to the economic issues. Immecliately 
after meeting with the Presiclent of Italy， the Prime Minister 
invitecl economic-relatecl Ministers -Minister of Treasury Carlo ホ
J¥. 
Azeglio Ciampi， Minister of Labor Tiziano Treu， to the Palazzo 
Chigi for an urgent examination of how they coulcl get consensus 0 
011 thc DPEF without叉ivingan impression that thc government 
(10() La Rりjubbl紅;'a，9 luglio 1996.“10 日onvedo complotti contro il 
governo，" di Ottavio Lucarelli 
(]()J) Coril're dela Sera， 10 luglio 1996.“Potcri fortir No. e la political 
che e debole，" di Giorgio Meletti. 
(102) had conceded. 
The DPEF contained the economic policies necessary for 
Italy's entry into European monetary integration. Armando 
Cossutta of the PRC emphasized that the PRC's objection was 
not against the Prodi government itself and said:“1 wish that the 
present government would survive for full five years. But some 
appropriate socio-economic policies that would secure 
employment and wages are needed." Meanwhile， there was an 
optimistic mood within the PDS concerning the PRC's problems. 
According to the internal argument of the PDS， the actual 
renewal of contracts can be based on the 3% level without 
changing thεtargeted inflation rate of 2.5%. With regard to 
employment， the PDS argues that a special fund could bεformed 
utilizing the money savec1 through promoting privatization. As a 
matter of fact， the PRC requestec1 that the government add to 
the DPEF a proviso that woulc1 protect wages. Cosslltta saic1: 
“The targetec1 inflation rate at 2.5% is okay， but we want a 
definite promise of the government to protect actllal wages. If the 
actual inflation rate exceec1s 2.5%， some c1ifference between the 
actllal inflation rate and the actllal wage increase will 
. ，(103) occur. 
While thεProdi government was shaken by the left， there 
emerged a new move among the centrists. Firstly， ex-Presid日日t
of Italy， Francesco Cossiga， declared that he， as“Italian Giscard 
D'Esting"， wanted to integrate center-right forces and Lamberto 
Dini whose political stance was very close to Cossiga's 
expressed sympathy. (l04) Secondly， Mino Martinazzoli， e侃x-leade白rs 
主 Oぱft出hePPI， met Cir 
suggεst伏eclt出ha抗thc woulcl not be able tω() r叩舟-emainin the PPI once a 
O 一一一一 一一一一
→ (102) La Repubblicα， 10 luglio 1996. “ r~ifonclazione ， scacco，日1go¥'(、rno，"cli 
Gennaro Schettino. 
(103) Corriere della Ser日， 10 1日Iio1996. "Prodi bocciato ql1attro volte ala 
Camera." cli Dino Vaiano 
(104) J)orr問中 dellaSera， 10 1時 lio1996. "Cossiga: l1n part山只Isca吋Jano，
Dini: cl'accordo. il futuro e li." 
centrist unification including the CCD and the CDU was 
( 105) realized. 
CONCLUSION 
1s the Ulivo， which is not a political federation but merely 
an electoral cartel， going to melt away when faced with critical 
decision.making and difficulties in governability? 1s the 
heterogeneity within the coalition government Prodi's Achilles' 
tendon? After the 1996 elections， F、austoBertinotti publicly 
declared:“1 won't be a government-killer." His rejection of the 
DPEF proposed by the Prodi government， however， actually 
disgraced the image and credibility of the Ulivo. Rigor vs. social 
solidarity， economic recovery vs. equity， managers' interests vs. 
unions' expectations -the government's choices between these 
alternatives were simply difficult from the very beginning. Faced 
with the mutually contradictory demands of Bertinotti and Dini， 
of the PDS and the PP1， the prime ministel勾 neededto show 
strong leadership of the government and to make efforts that 
(106) might have to be aborted. 
On April 21， 1996， Italy put an end to one regime that had 
been characterized by the Craxian-Berlusconian populism and 
soft peronism that had covered Italy from the 1980s until 
recently， except during the technocratic governments of Ciampi 
and Dini. (107) Despite the victory of the center】left，however， 
1taly is stil faced with certain risks in that it stil1 contains 
rightwings that have not gained democratic credibility yet. The 
conservatives within the ce凶er are not strong enough to 主
ノ、
overcome the temptation to seek their support 
For the Uli1Jo， tbe situation became even more difficult 0 
thereafter. While European pressure became stronger， Bossi 
(105) Corγ"iere de la Ser，ι， 10 luglio 1996“Rifare la DC? Per De Mita era 
solo una provocazioue." 
(106) La Repubblica， 10 luglio 1996，“L'Ulivo ferito，" di Giovanni 
Valentini 
agitated local electorates to separate Northern Italy as an 
independent nation caIled Padania. The left-Ieaning capitalist De 
Benedetto was overthrown because of managerial failure. The 
inflation rate deteriorated from 10.4% of 1993 to 12.3% in 1996. 
In such a situation， Prime Minister Prodi signed broad-ranged 
labor contracts between the unions and business leaders that 
aim at reduction of working time， revitalization of labor markets， 
resolution of unemployment particularly in the South. (I08) On the 
other hand， the government which by al means wanted to avoid 
Italy's break from European monetary unification， proposed an 
extremely strict (and unpopular) plan to cut huge public deficits 
including the Euro special tax of 15 trillion lira. 
The Prodi government may seem to be based on orthodox 
pacts between capitalists and workers. Yet， itis clear that these 
pacts transcend the traditional domestic framework when totally 
new problems of Constitutional reform and European monetary 
integration are taken into account. Italy's transition to the 
Second Republic will， therefore， evolve by questioning the very 
form of the politico-economic regime: which capitalism should 
Italy choose in a changing international context? The Italian 
center-left government needs to have highly political ski1ls to 
tackle the difficult projects involved in building the new 
institutions of the Second Republic and stay clean of the center-
rightist's sharp roll-back， by keeping a delicate balance between 
the European-oriented liberals and the welfare statists. 
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(107) Paolo Flores D'Arcais. 1996. La destra che non c'e. Micro Mega， 
2196， p.7 
(108) La Repubblica， 25 luglio 1996. “Un patto per rilanciare 
l'occupazione，" di Vittoria Sivo. 
